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Abstract	
In	this	policy	brief,	we	first	highlight	some	peculiar	characteristics,	from	an	economic	point	of	
view,	of	the	current	Covid-19	crisis.	We	stress	its	exogenous	and	symmetric	nature	with	respect	
to	Eurozone	countries,	as	well	as	the	complex	mix	of	supply	and	demand	shocks	it	entails.	Given	
these	 features,	 we	 then	 suggest	 two	 intertwined	 policy	 measures	 in	 order	 to	 tackle	 the	
emergency	 phase	 of	 the	 crisis	 and	 the	 subsequent	 recovery.	 We	 first	 advice	 the	 pervasive	
intervention	 of	 Eurozone	 governments	 in	 support	 of	 business	 and	 households	 income	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 “suspended”	 economy	 that	 measures	 against	 the	 diffusion	 of	 Covid-19	 have	
forcefully	 given	 rise.	 We	 advise	 the	 ECB	 to	 monetize	 all	 public	 expenditures	 linked	 to	 this	
emergency	plan	by	purchasing	public	bonds	in	the	primary	market,	and	to	subsequently	write	
them	off	or	exclude	these	 issuances	from	the	computation	of	public	debt-to-GDP	ratios.	With	
no	 signs	 of	 inflationary	 pressures	 coming,	 the	 ECB	 intervention	 would	 avoid	 Eurozone	
governments	 to	 pile	 up	 considerably	 higher	 stocks	 of	 debts	 and	 would	 help	 to	 bypass	 the	
current	 political	 impasse	 among	 Eurozone	 Member	 States	 as	 to	 the	 creation	 and	 realise	 of	
Eurobonds.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 emergency	 phase,	 we	 suggest	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	
massive	 Europe-wide	 recovery	 plan	 centred	on	public	 investment	 addressing	 the	 long-lasting	
technological	 and	 environmental	 challenges	 of	 these	 years,	 and	 financed	 by	 the	 European	
Investment	bank	through	the	issuance	of	Recovery	Bonds.				
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Fighting	the	COVID-19	emergency	and	re-launching	the	European	economy:	
debt	monetization	and	recovery	bonds	
	
	
1.	Introduction.	
The	global	spread	of	the	Covid-19	crisis	is	now	in	the	headlines	of	all	media	worldwide,	and	it	is	
at	 the	 center	 of	 daily	 discussions	 among	 politicians,	 policy-makers,	 policy	 advisors,	 scientists	
and	common	people	alike.	This	is	rightly	so	given	the	tough	toll	this	crisis	is	asking	to	the	world	
in	terms	of	losses	of	human	lives	and	radical	changes	to	our	everyday	habits	and	routines.		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 scientific	 response	 to	 the	 current	pandemic,	 epidemiology,	 virology	
(say	medicine	more	broadly),	and	pharma	are,	by	 far,	 the	 fields	of	 research	most	affected	by	
the	crisis,	as	they	are	struggling	to	find	an	effective	cure	or,	even	better,	a	vaccine	against	the	
coronavirus.	Economics,	however,	is	not	immune,	as	it	is	now	clear	to	everybody	that	the	Covid-
19	 pandemic	 will	 have	 sharp	 repercussions	 on	 economic	 activity,	 employment	 levels,	 the	
income	of	households	and	businesses,	and	ultimately	on	public	budgets.		
The	spread	of	Covid-19	has	set	a	time	for	major	changes	in	governments’	and	central	banks’	
policies.	There	is	consensus	among	economists	that	the	governments	of	developed	countries	in	
Europe	 and	 in	 the	 USA,	 i.e.,	 the	 current	 epicenters	 of	 the	 pandemic,	 will	 have	 to	 take	
extraordinary	 actions,	most	 probably	war	 time-like	measures	 in	 terms	 of	 their	magnitude,	 in	
order	to	deal	with	the	disruptive	economic	consequences	of	Covid-19	crisis.	The	overwhelming	
pressure	 upon	 healthcare	 systems	 and	 the	 forced	 lockdown	 of	 economic	 activities	 require	
massive	 urgent	 emergency	 reactions	 in	 order	 to	 tame	 the	 most	 direct	 and	 immediate	
consequences	of	the	crisis.	In	the	aftermath	of	such	emergency	phase,	governments	will	need	
to	implement	further	interventions	in	order	to	“prevent	a	recession	morphing	into	a	prolonged	
depression”	(Draghi,	2020).	
Bold	government	interventions	might	obviously	imply	a	considerable	increase	in	public	debt.	
However,	financial	concerns	should	not	limit	by	any	means	governments’	actions,	since	that	the	
cost	 of	 hesitation	 may	 be	 dramatic	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 present	 and	 future	 social	 wellbeing.	
Concerns	 over	 the	 implications	 for	 the	 European	 public	 balance	 sheets	may	 be	 justified,	 but	
they	 completely	 vanish	 in	 front	 of	 the	 catastrophe	 that	 major	 damages	 on	 the	 European	
productive	system	could	cause.	And	this	 is	even	more	compelling	by	 taking	 into	account	 that	
sound	public	finance	ultimately	depends	on	a	robust	productive	system.		
In	 this	 policy	 brief,	 we	 advance	 a	 series	 of	 proposals	 about	 which	 specific	 measures	
governments	should	take	given	the	unique	nature	of	the	ongoing	crisis,	and	how	they	should	be	
financed.	We	 focus	 on	 the	 Eurozone.	 According	 to	 the	most	 recent	 forecasts	 from	Goldman	
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Sachs	 (Goldman	Sachs,	2020),	 the	Eurozone	 stands	out	as	 the	 region	potentially	 affected	 the	
most	 by	 the	 economic	 consequences	 of	 the	 pandemic.	 Perhaps	more	 importantly,	 last	week	
talks	 among	 European	 leaders	 sadly	 showed	 that,	 differently	 from	 other	 countries,	 no	
agreement	exists	about	how	to	tackle	the	challenges	posed	by	Covid-19	with	a	joint,	cohesive	
and	unique	European	 response.	 It	 is	of	paramount	 importance	 to	provide	policy	makers	with	
some	advices	about	which	are,	in	our	view,	the	best	responses	to	the	current	shock	in	order	to	
avoid	it	becoming	a	long	lasting	“L-shaped”	downturn	with	no	return.	
Our	proposal	hinges	upon	two	lines.	We	first	advise	a	strong	emergency	action	by	Eurozone	
governments	covering	operative	costs	of	companies,	small	and	medium	firms	in	particular,	and	
guaranteeing	 income	 flows	 to	 households	 in	 the	 context	 a	 “suspended”	 economy.	 In	 other	
words,	“[t]he	 job	 is	maintaining	 the	economy	on	 life	support	during	a	period	of	an	artificially	
induced	coma	while	we	address	 the	public	health	challenge”	 (Tooze,	2020).	We	then	suggest	
the	implementation	of	a	Europe-wide	recovery	plan	based	on	public	investment	and	addressing	
the	not-to-be-forgotten	 climate	 crisis,	 and	 the	now	well	 understood	needs	of	 our	 healthcare	
systems.	We	propose	these	interventions	to	be	financed	by	two	sets	of	bonds:	(i)	those	issued	
by	the	national	governments	to	cover	emergency	costs	and	monetized	by	the	ECB,	thus	giving	
rise	 to	 a	 sort	 of	 “mediated”	 helicopter	money;	 (ii)	 Recovery	 bonds	 to	 be	 issued	 at	 European	
level	 (e.g.	 by	 the	 European	 Investment	 Bank)	 –	 let’s	 call	 them	 European	 Pandemic	 Recovery	
Bonds	(EPRB)1	–	to	relaunch	the	European	economy	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	health	
crisis.	The	first	point	is	indispensable,	urgent	and	might	perhaps	help	to	overcome	the	existing	
contrast	 among	 Eurozone	 governments	 (even	 though	 implying	 other	 types	 of	 institutional	
changes).	The	second	one	is	equally	relevant,	and	indeed	much	needed	regardless	the	current	
crisis,	though	there	is	a	little	more	time	for	discussion.	
	
2.	Three	crucial	aspects	of	the	Covid-19	economic	shock	
There	is	wide	consensus	among	economists	that	the	economic	shock	associated	to	the	spread	
of	the	Covid-19	virus	is	something	unique,	probably	with	costs	not	seen	over	the	last	70	years.	It	
is	important	to	briefly	outline	some	of	the	crucial	aspects	of	this	shock,	and	the	differences	with	
respect	 to	 the	 previous	 ones,	 because	 this	 may	 help	 us	 to	 understand	 which	 are	 the	 most	
appropriate	policy	responses.	We	would	like	to	stress	three	points.	
1) There	 is	no	doubt	 that	 the	Covid-19	economic	 shock	 is	a	 truly	exogenous	one.	 It	does	not	
depend	on	 the	will	or	previous	misbehavior	of	any	government	or	private	sector.	This	 is	a	
																																								 																				
1	 See	 also	 Kirkegaard	 (2020),	 who	 proposes	 the	 issuance	 of	 European	 Covid-19	 Investment	 Recovery	 Bond	
(ECIRBs).	According	to	Kirkegaard,	these	“would	be	very	long	(30-to-50	year)	maturity	bonds	issued	by	a	European	
institution,	such	as	the	ESM	if	only	for	the	eurozone,	or	the	European	Commission	or	European	Investment	Bank	
for	the	entire	European	Union	[…],	and	eligible	for	purchase	by	the	ECB”	(Kirkegaard,	2020).	In	a	similar	vein,	here,	
we	 suggest	 the	 EIB	 issuing	 long-term	 bonds	 aimed	 at	 financing	 European	 recovery	 based	 on	 a	 large-scale	
investment	plan.	
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significant	difference	with	respect	to	the	frequently	cited	2007-2008	financial	crisis.	Indeed,	
the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 last	 financial	 crisis	 was	 due	 to	 innovations	 and	 new	 practices	 in	 the	
financial	 sector,	 the	emerge	of	 the	so-called	“shadow	banking”,	which	were	 in	 turn	 tightly	
connected	 to	 long-lasting	 unfolding	 developments	 and	 changes	 in	 advanced	 economies,	
rising	 inequality	 first	 and	 foremost	 (Botta	 et	 al.,	 2019).	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	
Eurozone,	even	though	the	financial	crisis	started	in	the	USA,	it	cannot	be	considered	as	an	
exogenous	 shock.	 European	 economies	 were	 initially	 affected	 by	 the	 worldwide	 financial	
meltdown	 because	 European	 banks	were	 actively	 engaged	 in	 the	 diffusion	 of	 “toxic”	 new	
financial	products,	or	 in	the	feeding	of	unsustainable	processes	such	as	housing	bubbles	 in	
Ireland,	Spain	and	Greece.	That	crisis	then	morphed	into	the	Eurozone	sovereign	debt	crisis	
due	to	(external)	imbalances	among	Eurozone	countries,	endogenously	built-up	in	the	initial	
phase	of	monetary	integration	(1999	–	2007),	and	the	institutional	deficiencies	in	monetary	
and,	especially,	fiscal	policy	(i.e.,	the	pro-cyclicality	of	austerity	measures	during	recessionary	
phases)	characterizing	the	European	institutional	building.	
2) The	Covid-19	economic	shock	undoubtedly	stands	out	as	a	symmetric	shock	affecting	in	the	
same	 way	 all	 Eurozone	 countries.	 It	 might	 certainly	 happen	 that	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 shock	
might	 slightly	 differ	 from	one	 country	 to	 the	 other,	 perhaps	 affecting	 Italy	 first,	 and	 then	
Spain,	France,	Germany,	and	other	Eurozone	economies.	Nevertheless,	if	we	take	2020	as	a	
whole,	there	are	little	doubts	that	all	these	economies	will	experience	a	recession.	
3) The	current	economic	crisis	consists	of	a	complex	mix	of	 supply	and	demand	shocks.	As	 to	
the	supply	side,	the	restrictive	measures	taken	by	governments	in	order	to	implement	social	
distancing	 and	 contain	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 virus	 have	 imposed	 several	 activities	 to	 stop	
offering	 their	 services.	 For	 instance,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	 entertainment	 industry,	 of	
hospitality,	restaurants	and	bars,	and	of	most	of	retail	activities.	An	additional	supply	shock	
comes	 from	 the	 lock	 down	 of	 some	 regions,	 if	 not	 entire	 countries.	 Indeed,	 with	 people	
being	confined	at	home,	workers	cannot	reach	workplace	and	firms	are	bound	to	stop	their	
operations.	 This	 may	 in	 turn	 give	 rise	 to	 shortages	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 those	 goods	 whose	
production	 is	 the	 result	of	 complex	value	chains	 involving	 inoperative	companies.	 Last	but	
not	 least,	 supply	 constraints	may	 also	 emerge	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 now	 vital	medical	 devices	
whose	 supply	 was	 unprepared	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 huge	 and	 unexpected	 increase	 in	 their	
demand.	
Restrictions	to	people	mobility	and	to	the	functioning	of	firms	have	simultaneously	induced	a	
tremendous	drop	in	aggregate	demand.	On	the	one	hand,	the	steep	rise	 in	unemployment	
records,	 the	 temporary	 suspension	 from	work,	 or	 the	 inactivity	 of	 the	 self-employed	 and	
freelance	workers	will	cause	households	to	cut	consumptions.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	no	
reason	 for	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	 a	 context	 of	 depressed	 demand,	 forced	 closure	 and	 radical	
uncertainty.	This	is	even	the	more	so	taking	into	account	that	many	companies	may	actually	
risk	to	go	bankrupt	once	completely	“deprived”	of	their	expected	cash	flows.	The	contraction	
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in	 aggregate	demand	 is	 so	 acute	 that	may	well	 explain	why	 inflation	 spikes	due	 to	 supply	
constraints	 do	 not	 represents	 a	 serious	 threats	 at	 the	 moment,	 but	 rather	 even	 more	
worrisome	deflationary	trends	seem	more	likely	to	come	(De	Grauwe,	2020).	
	
3.	Emergency	measures	for	a	“suspended”	economy	and	beyond														
What	emerges	from	the	above	three	aspects	of	the	Covid-19	crisis	is	a	suspended	economy.	The	
tough	but	equally	necessary	and	desirable	measures	implemented	by	governments	to	stop	the	
diffusion	of	the	virus	have	simply	made	most	part	of	the	private	sector	unable	to	function,	as	
stuck	in	a	sort	of	limbo,	or	have	induced	a	significant	reduction	in	their	activity.	
There	 is	 a	 mounting	 debate	 among	 economists	 about	 which	 are	 the	 most	 appropriate	
monetary	 and	 fiscal	 measures	 for	 tackling	 such	 an	 extraordinary	 situation.	 Some	 of	 these	
actions	have	been	already	announced	by	national	governments	and	by	the	ECB.	
A	 first	 proposal	 comes	 from	previous	 ECB	governor	Mario	Draghi	 (2020),	who	emphasizes	
the	 importance	 of	 financial	 institutions	 accommodating	 all	 credit	 requests	 from	 the	 private	
business	sector	in	order	to	avoid	firms’	bankruptcies	and	reductions	in	the	employment	level.	In	
this	sense,	Draghi,	as	many	others	(e.g.	Bénassy-Quéré	et	al.	2020)	take	as	welcome	news	ECB’s	
most	 recent	 decisions	 to	 extend	 LTRO	operations,	 to	 expand	quantitative	 easing	 (which	may	
help	large	corporations	to	issue	corporate	bonds	at	cheap	rate),	to	reduce	below	zero	the	main	
refinancing	rate	for	banks	(de	facto	subsidizing	their	activity),	and	to	temporarily	slacken	banks’	
capital	 requirements.	 In	 their	 view,	 all	 these	measures	may	help	banks	 to	 expand	 lending	 as	
much	as	possible	and	at	very	low	rates,	possibly	close	to	zero.	
Draghi	himself	recognizes	that	these	actions	might	not	be	enough	should	the	lockdown	last	
long.	At	that	point,	governments	might	have	to	 intervene	by	compensating	borrowers	and	de	
facto	bailing	out	private	companies	by	moving	private	liabilities	onto	a	much	expanding	public	
balance	 sheet.	 Together	 with	 extraordinary	 measures	 already	 taken	 in	 order	 to	 support	
healthcare	systems,	this	will	obviously	imply	that	“much	higher	public	debt	levels	will	become	a	
permanent	 feature	 of	 our	 economies	 and	will	 be	 accompanied	 by	 private	 debt	 cancellation”	
(Draghi,	2020).	
Economists	all	agree	that	governments	should	massively	 intervene	via	public	expenditures.	
European	 institutions	have	 somehow	conceded	 their	approval	by	 temporarily	 suspending	 the	
Stability	and	Growth	pact	(SGP).	Their	views,	however,	diverge	when	it	comes	to	the	financing	
of	much	larger	fiscal	deficits	of	Eurozone	countries.	
The	 ECB	 has	 already	 taken	 a	 fundamental	 step	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 by	 creating	 the	
Pandemic	 Emergency	 Purchase	 Programme	 (PEPP).	 This	will	 add	 780	billion	 euros	 to	 existing	
quantitative	easing	and	make	easier	and	cheaper	the	issuance	of	new	public	bonds	on	financial	
markets	 (overcoming	 the	 33%	 limit	 on	 a	 single	 country’s	 bonds	 share).	Given	 such	 favorable	
monetary	 context,	 some	 economists	 think	 that	 the	 best	way	 to	 go	would	 be	 the	 creation	 of	
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common	very	long-term	(50,	100	years	or	even	perpetual)	Eurobonds	issued	by	single	member	
countries	but	 jointly	guaranteed	by	the	tax	capacity	of	the	Eurozone	as	a	whole	(Giavazzi	and	
Tabellini,	2020;	Bénassy-Quéré	et	al.,	2020).		
The	 last	meeting	 among	 European	 leaders,	 however,	 has	 clearly	 revealed	 that	 there	 is	 no	
consensus	 on	 this	 option.	 Northern	 Europe	 countries,	 Germany	 first	 and	 foremost,	 do	 not	
support	the	introduction	of	Eurobonds.2	As	a	consequence	of	such	a	political	constraint,	several	
economists	 revert	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 using	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 (ESM)	 to	 finance	
Member	 States’	 emergency	 expenditures.	 This	 financing	 should	 take	 place	 through	 a	 newly	
designed	and	dedicated	financial	scheme,	the	so-called	Covid	Credit	Line	(CCL),	characterized	by	
a	much	 longer	 time	horizon	 (with	 respect	 to	 the	 two	year	 time	 frame	associated	 to	standard	
ESM’s	credit)	and	reduced	conditionality	(Bénassy-Quéré	et	al.,	2020).	
Despite	obvious	differences,	the	above	proposals	share	a	common	aspect.	They	all	 foresee	
emergency	plans	grounded	on	the	functioning	of	financial	markets.	Whilst	market	mechanisms	
are	suspended	and	cannot	work	for	most	part	of	the	real	economy,	 its	financial	needs	should	
still	remain	satisfied	by	the	“normal”	provision	of	credit	from	financial	institutions.	This	aspect	
is	 not	 trivial.	 In	 fact,	 it	 implies	 that,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 emergency	 phase,	 private	 companies	
and/or	the	public	sector	might	be	 loaded	with	a	higher	stock	of	debt,	albeit	at	reduced	or	no	
(interest)	 costs.	 And	 this	 fact	 may	 in	 turn	 weaken	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 recovery	 measures	
implemented	 in	 the	 post-pandemic	 period	 but	 in	 fragile	 economies	 overburdened	 by	 newly	
created	emergency-related	debt.	
Whilst	 frequently	 treated	 independently,	 the	emergency	and	post-pandemic	phases	of	 the	
current	crisis	are	tightly	connected	each	other.	It	is	by	recognizing	this	fact	that	Jordi	Galì	(2020)	
suggests	an	alternative	way,	which	 relies	on	 the	 so-called	 “helicopter	money”.	This	may	 take	
the	form	of	either	direct	money	transfers	from	central	banks	account	to	citizens’	bank	accounts,	
which	is	generally	labeled	as	“direct	cash	handouts”,	or	by	“monetary	financing”	governments’	
expenditures	by	providing	governments	with	not	repayable	resources.	According	to	this	view,	
whilst	central	banks	will	create	all	the	needed	resources	to	deal	with	the	emergency,	no	extra	
debt	will	be	created.	
	
In	this	policy	brief,	we	advance	a	proposal	for	both	the	emergency	and	post-pandemic	phases	
of	the	Covid-19	crisis.	It	takes	inspiration	form	the	main	features	of	the	present	economic	shock	
as	 outlined	 above,	 and	 from	 the	 other	 policy	 options	 just	 described.	 Our	 proposal	 could	 be	
summarized	in	four	main	points.									
1) Actions	to	tackle	economic	emergency.	Given	the	present	 impediments	to	the	functioning	
of	 the	 economy	 posed	 by	much	 needed	 confinement	 restrictions,	 Eurozone	 governments	
should	replace	the	working	of	large	part	of	the	private	sector.	The	idea,	again,	is	to	suspend	
																																								 																				
2	Unfortunately,	Eurobonds	–	or	Coronabonds	after	this	emergency	–	represent	a	good	idea	but	hardly	viable	from	
a	political	point	of	view	as	recently	stressed	by	Bini	Smaghi	(2020)	among	others.	
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for	a	while	the	normal	functioning	of	Eurozone	economies.	While	continuing	to	remunerate	
public	 servants,	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 should	 be	 put	 on	 freeze.	 All	 businesses	
requiring	support	should	receive	governmental	resources	covering	around	80%	of	their	labor	
costs	and	the	full	amount	of	their	fixed	costs	according	recent	administrative/fiscal	data.	This	
should	be	done	in	favor	of	all	businesses	forced	to	close	and	of	those,	which	are	still	active,	
but	experienced	major	reduction	of	their	demand.	For	firms	under	this	regime,	no	lay-off	of	
employed	 workers	 should	 be	 allowed.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 government	 should	 replace	
lacking	demand	during	the	emergency	period.	Similar	transfers	should	be	directed	towards	
self-employed	and	freelance	workers	currently	unable	to	work	due	to	restrictions	 imposed	
for	 the	 sake	of	public	health.	 Social	 care	measures	 should	also	be	 taken	 for	 those	 citizens	
who	are	unemployed	but	do	not	have	access	to	standard	welfare	transfers	by	the	state	due	
to	 their	 past	 employment	 history,	 may	 it	 be	 occasional	 employment	 or	 jobs	 in	 the	 black	
market.	 Indeed,	 a	 non-negligible	 part	 of	 the	 population	 is	 employed	 in	 the	 black	market,	
often	not	for	their	choice.	Last	but	not	least,	extra	compensation	should	be	remunerated	to	
still	 active	 workers	 employed	 in	 vital	 sectors,	 from	 hospitals	 to	 food,	 energy,	
communications,	etc.	
2) How	to	finance	the	emergency.	In	terms	of	actions,	our	proposal	is	in	line	with	the	idea	of	
governments	 as	 “buyer	of	 last	 resort”,	 already	advanced	by	 Saez	 and	Zucman	 (2020),	 and	
somehow	announced	by	some	governments	(see	some	aspects	of	the	USA	emergency	plan	
and	 the	 Danish	 government’s	 intervention).	 Differently	 from	 Saez	 and	 Zucman	 (2020),	
however,	 we	 stress	 that	 the	 financing	 of	 this	 measures	 mainly	 come	 from	 the	 European	
Central	 Bank,	 and	 not	 from	 an	 increase	 of	 taxes,	 even	 for	 the	wealthiest	 (even	 though	 a	
more	 progressive	 taxation	 is	 highly	 desirable	 and	 required	 at	 European	 level)	 More	
specifically,	 we	 foresee	 a	 scheme	 according	 to	 which	 emergency	 spending	 by	 Eurozone	
governments	 should	 be	 certified	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 based	 on	 shared	 rules	
(obviously,	it	should	be	taken	into	account	that	some	governments	already	spent	money	to	
fight	the	emergency).	Provided	that	the	SGP	should	remain	suspended	for	the	all	duration	of	
the	 crisis,	 thus	 allowing	 Eurozone	 countries	 to	 spend	 whatever	 it	 takes	 to	 save	 their	
economies,	 such	 certification	 from	 the	 EU	 Commission	 can	 effectively	 replace	 “weak”	
conditionality	 associated	 to	 emergency	 credit	 line	 from	 the	 ESM.	 Given	 the	 extraordinary	
nature	 of	 public	 intervention	 during	 this	 (almost	 total)	 suspension	 of	 market	 activities,	
governments	should	then	finance	their	emergency	plans	by	issuing	public	bonds	that	the	ECB	
directly	purchases	on	the	primary	market	(as	suggested	also	by	De	Grauwe,	2020).	This	point	
certainly	represents	a	violation	of	the	ECB	statute.	Under	the	present	emergency,	however,	
also	the	prohibition	for	the	ECB	to	buy	government	bonds	on	the	primary	markets	should	be	
(at	 least	 temporarily)	 lifted.	 If	 such	 an	 economic	 taboo	 cannot	 be	 challenged	 openly,	 it	
should	be	addressed	 implicitly.	 ECB’s	purchases	of	 government	bonds	on	primary	markets	
could	take	place	indirectly	via	the	creation	of	a	Public	Special	Purpose	Vehicle	(PSPV).	This	is	
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a	financial	institution	aimed	at	buying	bonds	from	governments	on	the	primary	market,	and	
then	 indirectly	 passing	 them	 to	 the	 ECB	 by	 issuing	 liabilities	 that	 ECB	 itself	 can	 purchase,	
perhaps	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ECB	 quantitative	 easing.	 Eventually,	 when	 public	 bonds	 issued	
during	the	emergency	come	to	maturity,	they	should	be	automatically	rolled	over	in	order	to	
monetize	 the	 emergency-related	 public	 debt.	 It	 is	worth	mentioning	 that	 such	 a	 proposal	
completely	 overcomes	 the	 political	 problem	 of	 the	 mutualization	 of	 public	 debt.	 Indeed,	
insofar	as	 the	ECB	monetizes	emergency-related	 issuances	of	public	bonds	by	all	Eurozone	
Member	 States,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 a	 joint	 guarantee	 of	 public	 debt.	 Our	 proposal	 will	
certainly	imply	no	less	challenging	temporary	amendments	in	the	relationship	between	the	
ECB	and	national	 governments.	Nonetheless,	 the	 close	 cooperation	between	governments	
and	 the	 ECB	we	 envisage	 in	 our	 proposal	 is	 vital	 for	 activating	 such	 emergency	 plan	 and	
rescue	Eurozone	economies.	 It	 is	also	meant	to	demonstrate	that	no	financial	speculations	
on	government	bonds	would	be	acceptable	during	this	emergency	period.	
3) Re-launching	the	economy	in	the	aftermath	of	the	emergency.	When	the	conditions	for	a	
gradual	return	to	social	life	and	for	a	restart	of	the	private	sector	hold,	European	institutions	
should	take	a	second	step	supporting	the	recovery	of	the	Eurozone	(though	this	is	what	we	
already	 needed	 even	before	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Covid-19	 crisis).	We	 think	 about	 a	 large-
scale	 plan	 for	 financing	 physical	 and	 digital	 infrastructures,	 healthcare	 and	 scientific	
research,	energy-saving	and	clean	technologies	along	an	ecological	transition.	In	the	case	of	
the	Eurozone,	the	Covid-19	crisis	is	hitting	a	limping	economic	system,	lagging	behind	in	the	
evolution	of	 key	 sectors	 (just	 to	make	an	example:	automotive)	and	characterized	by	very	
low	level	of	public	investment.3	At	the	global	level,	the	pandemic	is	taking	place	in	the	midst	
of	 an	 ecological	 crisis.	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 recovery	 plan	 is	 thus	 not	 limited	 to	 jumpstart	
economic	activity,	but	it	rather	aims	at	guiding	the	economy	of	the	European	Union,	and	of	
the	 Eurozone	 in	 particular,	 toward	 a	 more	 sustainable,	 technologically	 advanced	 and	
inclusive	 socio-economic	 system.4	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 public	 investment	 may	 represent	 an	
important	 contribution	 to	 euro	 area	 aggregate	demand.	 The	 countercyclical	 aspect	 of	 this	
plan	is	fundamental	in	order	to	support	solid	recovery	in	the	profitability	of	private	business	
and	prompt	a	strong	economic	rebound.	On	the	other	hand,	given	its	exceptional	character,	
and	 consistently	with	 the	 view	 recently	 expressed	by	 the	 ECB	 (see	 Lagarde,	 2019),	 such	 a	
recovery	 plan	 should	 shape	 the	 long-run	 development	 path	 of	 the	 European	 economy	 by	
supporting	public	investment	(say	infrastructure)	at	European	level,	but	also	country	specific	
																																								 																				
3	See	Della	Posta	et	al.	(2019)	for	an	analysis	of	investment	deficiencies	in	Europe	and	the	necessity,	after	the	two	
recessions	of	 2008-2009	and	2012-2013	 (and	even	more	now,	we	might	 add),	 of	 a	Grand	European	 Investment	
Plan	 that,	 among	 other	 things,	 could	 help	 in	 restoring	 a	 pro-European	 sentiment	 (after	 fiscal	 austerity	 and	 the	
consequent	dreadful	social	conditions).			
4	 There	 are	 proposals	 supporting	 a	 European	 Green	 New	 Deal.	 See	 for	 instance	 the	 European	 Commission’s	
roadmap	 for	 a	 European	 Green	 Deal:	 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-
deal_en.	
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actions	 in	 selected	 “strategic”	 areas	 (say	 improvements	 in	 the	 healthcare	 systems	 or	 the	
decarbonization	of	European	economies).	Time	is	a	crucial	element.	A	major	investment	plan	
needs	to	be	 implemented	as	soon	as	 the	health	emergency	ends.	The	 later	EU	 institutions	
and	 national	 governments	 intervene	 to	 reignite	 private	 sector’s	 confidence,	 and	 to	
counteract	self-reinforcing	vicious	circle	of	low	level	of	demand	and	production,	the	harder	
will	be	for	the	whole	European	economy	to	recover.		
4) Financing	the	relaunch	of	the	economy.	In	order	to	emphasize	its	Europe-wide	nature,	the	
recovery	plan	we	described	at	point	three	should	be	 implemented	and	financed	by	 issuing	
recovery	bonds,	e.g.	EPRBs.	Differently	 from	Eurobonds	 (i.e.,	public	bonds	 issued	by	single	
countries	 but	 jointly	 guaranteed	 by	 all	 Member	 States),	 here	 we	 intend	 them	 as	 bonds	
issued	 by	 a	 vital	 European	 institution	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Investment	 Bank	 (EIB),	 freely	
tradable	 in	 the	 financial	 markets,	 and	 representing	 a	 safe	 asset	 for	 financial	 markets	
themselves	 at	 global	 level.	 In	 our	 view,	 EIB-issued	 EPRBs	 should	 also	 stand	 out	 as	 eligible	
assets	 for	 ECB’s	 asset	 purchase	 programs,	 with	 the	 ECB	 deciding	 which	 amount	 of	 EPRB-
financed	expenditures	to	ultimately	cover	with	money	(i.e.,	by	purchasing	EPRB	themselves),	
and	which	part	to	leave	to	investors’	appetite	for	such	an	European	asset.	In	this	sense,	ECB	
should	 act	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 fine-tuning	 of	 Eurozone	 inflationary	 dynamics	 with	
respect	to	its	own	inflationary	target.	Nonetheless,	the	ECB	should	also	bear	clearly	in	mind	
that	both	 the	 ability	 to	meet	 financial	 commitments	by	 European	 firms	and	governments,	
i.e.,	 the	 financial	 stability	of	 the	euro	area,	 	 and	 the	value	of	 the	euro	currency	ultimately	
depends	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 underlying	 productive	 system.	 All	 concerns	 for	 ECB	
“monetary	financing”	of	the	above	plans	should	thus	pale	in	front	of	the	urgency	to	preserve	
and	re-launch	the	European	productive	system.		
	
Some	final	considerations	are	required	as	to	the	implications	of	the	different	forms	of	financing	
of	the	above	emergency	and	recovery	plans,	and	of	government	interventions	more	in	general.	
With	respect	to	bond	issuance,	major	crisis-led	increases	in	public	debt	are	likely	unavoidable.	
There	is	no	magic	number	in	economic	theory	as	to	the	maximum	level	public	debt	could	reach	
whilst	 remaining	 sustainable.	 Numerous	 elements,	 of	 institutional	 nature	 mainly,	 but	 also	
historical	and	cultural,	come	into	play.	This	said,	high	levels	of	public	debt	may	obviously	raise	
some	concerns	as	to	the	sustainability	and	composition	of	future	public	expenditure	(due	to	the	
implied	 burden	 of	 interests’	 payment),	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 willingness	 of	 financial	 markets	 to	
purchase	Eurozone	government	bonds.	The	economic	 theory	 tells	us	 that	when	public	bonds	
are	not	nominated	in	a	foreign	currency,	the	central	bank	issuing	that	currency	will	always	be	
able	to	support,	in	extreme	circumstances,	the	sustainability	of	public	debt	and	the	capability	of	
the	government	to	honor	 its	payment	commitments.	Despite	 losses	to	 international	 investors	
could	still	come	from	the	possible	depreciation	of	the	currency,	the	risk	of	public	default	will	be	
much	lower.	This	is	why	the	Eurozone	badly	needs	a	revision	of	the	ECB’s	mandate	in	order	to	
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make	it	more	aligned	to	what	other	independent	central	banks	can	actually	do	when	it	comes	to	
the	 potential	 support	 provided	 to	 fiscal	 authorities	 (national	 governments	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
Eurozone)	engaged	in	substantial	counter-cyclical	fiscal	expansions.		
Economic	concerns	may	also	arise	from	the	monetization	of	public	expenditures.	Inflation	is	
not	directly	linked	to	the	amount	of	money	issued	by	the	central	bank,	and	no	major	concerns	
of	 inflation	 seem	 to	 plausible	 today.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 remind	 that	 the	 present	
crisis,	unlike	the	2009	Great	Recession,	 involves	some	aspects	of	a	potentially	relevant	supply	
shock	so	that,	 if	 fought	only	via	demand	side	policies	(whatever	the	financing),	 it	may	lead	to	
undesired	 levels	 of	 inflation.	 It	 is	 precisely	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 it	 is	 of	 vital	 importance	 to	
intervene	 to	 preserve	 and	 re-launch	 the	 production	 potential	 of	 the	 European	 productive	
system.	 The	 much-needed	 countercyclical	 fiscal	 policy	 should	 therefore	 not	 be	 limited	 to	
relaunching	 aggregate	demand.	 Still	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that,	 higher	 level	 of	
inflation	than	what	we	have	been	witnessing	in	the	recent	years	will	be	desirable	to	lower	the	
burden	of	the	debt	inherited	by	the	crisis.5	
All	in	all,	public	spending	during	the	emergency	and	along	the	recovery	plan	would	impede	a	
further	 drop	 in	GDP,	 thus	 avoiding	 an	 even	 greater	 surge	 in	 the	 public	 debt	 over	GDP	 ratio.	
However,	European	countries	should	seriously	think	about	applying	a	“golden	rule”	according	
to	which	government	expenditures	for	investments	are	not	considered	for	the	computation	of	
the	SGP	fiscal	rules	(a	pact	that	should	be	anyhow	reformed	in	other	directions,	firstly	removing	
pro-cyclical	 mechanisms).	 Moreover,	 a	 European	 plan	 to	 boost	 the	 recovery	 after	 the	
emergency,	and	based	on	investments,	would	have	a	beneficial	role	both	on	the	demand	side,	
by	 increasing	 aggregate	 demand	 –	 that	 could	 give	 rise	 to	 an	 inflationary	 pressure	 as	 time	
elapses,	and	the	supply	side,	by	enlarging	the	productive	base	–	that	instead	would	contribute	
in	keeping	inflation	under	control.	
	
4.	A	perspective	on	the	future	of	the	Eurozone	
The	project	of	building	a	European	Union	with	common	markets	and	institutions	has	proceeded	
by	alternate	phases,	with	great	difficulties	that	have	sometimes	produced	relevant	progresses	
in	the	process	of	European	 integration.	While	fiscal	policy	has	remained	anchored	to	national	
decisions	and	inter-governmental	coordination,	due	to	the	too	much	timid	political	climate	and	
the	obsession	with	moral	hazard,	monetary	policy	has	greatly	changed	under	President	Draghi	
to	respond	more	effectively	to	the	long-lasting	consequences	of	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis,	
																																								 																				
5	Several	more	lessons	ought	to	be	taken	from	this	dramatic	event.	One	is	particularly	important	in	our	view.	The	
importance	of	strong	public	health	systems	is	self-evident	 in	 light	of	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	These	need	reliable	
and	 stable	 source	 of	 funding	 and	 therefore	 are	 incompatible	 with	 a	 European	 Union	 in	 which	 fiscal	 systems	
compete	 to	 attract	 financial	 capitals	 by	 lowering	 tax	 rates.	 A	 system	 of	 minimum	 European	 tax	 rates	 both	 on	
corporation	 and	 wealthy	 individuals	 is	 necessary	 to	 counter	 this	 major	 negative	 externality	 of	 free	 capital	
movement.	
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and	to	 the	specific	problems	within	 the	Eurozone.	A	 further	step	urgently	needs	 to	be	taken.	
Fiscal	 and	monetary	 policy	must	 evolve	 jointly	 at	 European	 level.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 time	 for	 self-
imposed	 restrictions	on	 the	 spending	 capacity	of	 the	public	 sector.	 It	 is	 the	 time	 to	abandon	
dogmas	and	flawed	economic	theories	on	the	functioning	of	monetary	systems.	With	the	likely	
collapse	of	aggregate	demand	in	the	Eurozone	as	a	consequence	of	the	fight	against	the	spread	
of	the	coronavirus,	a	new	expansion	of	the	ECB’s	balance	sheet	to	create	money	is	needed,	this	
time	to	be	used	in	the	real	sectors	of	the	economy.	This	monetary	expansion	will	hardly	have	
any	significant	 inflationary	 impact.	And	 if	 this	were	not	 the	case,	a	 (modest)	 increase	 in	price	
dynamics	might	actually	be	welcomed,	as	 it	can	make	more	sustainable	the	 likely	higher	debt	
burden	inherited	from	this	crisis.	
The	 temporary	 suspension	 of	 the	 SGP	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 current	 health	 and	 economic	
emergency	is	certainly	a	positive	fact.	Nonetheless,	a	projection	over	the	longer	period	of	the	
ongoing	 discussions	 among	 Eurozone	 Member	 states	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that,	 once	 the	
emergency	phase	will	be	over,	pro-austerity	countries	will	push	 for	 reintroducing	 tough	 fiscal	
rules	and	austerity	plans,	reiterating	the	sad	story	we	already	saw	in	the	recent	past.	If	we	think	
about	 a	 huge	 contraction	 in	 GDP	 and	 a	 strong	 increase	 in	 government	 spending	 jointly	
contribute	to	give	rise	to	a	massive	surge	in	public	debt-to-GDP	ratio,	we	can	suddenly	realize	
that	 the	 application	 of	 SGP-	 or	 Fiscal	 Compact-inspired	 fiscal	 discipline	 is	 untenable.	 It	 is	
precisely	 to	 avoid	 this	 dismal	 scenario	 that	 we	 suggest	 that	 (i)	 the	 emergency-led	 debt	
accumulated	 during	 this	 crisis	 is	 not	 accounted	 for	 the	 application	 of	 fiscal	 rules	 once	 the	
emergency	 is	over;	 (ii)	bonds	 issued	by	national	governments	during	 the	emergency	are	 fully	
monetized	by	the	ECB	–	i.e.,	they	cancelled	or	forgiven	at	maturity;	(iii)	the	ECB	acts	directly	as	a	
buyer	 of	 last	 resort,	 bypassing	 governments,	 thus	 implementing	 the	 operations	 already	
described	 above.	 This	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘helicopter	 money’	 calibrated	 on	 the	 need	 to	 replace	 the	
working	 of	 the	 private	 economy	during	 the	 suspension	 of	market	 activities	 under	 the	 health	
crisis.	
In	the	long	run,	European	Institutions,	and	Eurozone	governments	in	particular,	need	to	take	
consciousness	that	changes	are	unavoidable,	as	the	current	crisis	makes	fiscal	rules	and	existing	
treaties	 outdated	 and	 inapplicable.	 Such	 long-run	 structural	 changes	 should	 not	 be	 the	
disorganized	results	of	concessions,	but	the	fruits	of	a	vision	for	the	recovery	and	development	
of	the	economy	of	European	Union	as	a	whole,	and	of	the	Eurozone	in	particular.	It	is	time	for	
the	 Eurozone	 to	 act	 as	 a	 union.	 If	 this	will	 not	 be	 the	 case	 even	 in	 front	 of	 such	 a	 dramatic	
emergency,	doubts	on	 the	very	 sense	 the	European	project	will	 be	 legitimized.	 In	a	way,	 the	
current	 Covid-19	 emergency	may	 be	 the	 last	 call	 to	make	 significant	 steps	 toward	 a	 proper	
political	union.	
Unfortunately,	 the	 state	 of	 the	 debate	 among	 Eurozone	 countries	 is	 rather	 disappointing.	
Despite	the	severity	of	 the	current	crisis	 requires	 immediate	and	bold	actions,	 it	 seems	to	be	
quite	unlikely	that	Eurozone	Member	States	could	reach	a	satisfactory	agreement	about	how	to	
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jointly	respond,	if	a	common	response	will	ever	be	found,	to	the	present	emergency	in	a	timely	
manner.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 some	 Eurozone	 Member	 States	 may	 resist	 any	 request	 for	 a	
permanent	revision	of	existing	fiscal	rules	or,	even	the	more	so,	for	the	creation	of	a	common	
European	fiscal	authority	mutualizing	national	debts.	 In	the	absence	of	a	reasonable	common	
view	among	Eurozone	countries	about	how	to	move	forwards	towards	a	fiscal	union,	the	ECB	
should	 be	 transformed	 in	 a	way	never	 imagined	before.	 This	means	 for	 the	 ECB	 to	 go	much	
beyond	 the	 very	narrow	view	 some	Member	 States	 share	of	 the	ECB	 itself	 as	 “controller”	of	
price	 stability	 only.	 Given	 the	 depth	 of	 the	 current	 health	 emergency	 and	 the	 challenges	 it	
poses	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 euro	 area,	 if	 we	 aim	 to	 save	 the	 euro,	 this	 time	 “whatever	 it	
takes”	requires	a	more	radical	move.					
These	long-term	reforms	missing,	a	disintegration	of	the	Eurozone	will	become	more	likely,	
especially	if	the	current	emergency	phase	will	last,	as	expected,	more	than	a	few	weeks.	If	even	
under	these	exceptional	conditions	disagreements	among	Member	States	will	persist	as	to	the	
need	of	acting	jointly	and	use	all	the	possible	tools	against	such	a	huge	symmetric	shock,	then	
single	countries	will	eventually	have	to	monetize	emergency-led	debts	by	 themselves.	 It	goes	
without	saying	that	this	will	 imply	leaving	the	Euro	and	returning	to	national	central	banks,	or	
perhaps	move	 towards	 a	 smaller	 aggregation	of	 countries	 agreeing	on	 a	 deeper	 “sharing”	of	
monetary	and	fiscal	policies	in	a	renewed	and	more	cooperative	Europe.	This	might	be	the	case	
of	a	Mediterranean	European	monetary	area,	perhaps	putting	together	France,	Italy	and	Spain,	
arising	 with	 its	 own	 currency,	 a	 common	 fiscal	 policy	 and	 a	 fully	 operational	 central	 bank.	
Needless	to	say,	this	is	a	very	different	type	of	Europe,	and	of	European	Monetary	Union,	with	
respect	to	what	thought	by	the	noble	fathers	of	European	integration.	This	is	why,	in	the	midst	
of	a	tremendous	health	and	economic	crisis,	we	more	than	ever	need	full	access	to	all	possible	
joint	 fiscal	 and	 monetary	 tools.	 The	 suspension	 of	 the	 SGP	 and	 now	 the	 discussion	 on	 a	
European	unemployment	dole	scheme	(though	with	a	very	limited	endowment),	as	well	as	the	
expanding	 operationality	 of	 the	 ECB	 through	 PEPP	 and	 other	measures,	 give	 us	 a	 hope	 that	
something	 is	 moving	 in	 Europe.	 But,	 especially	 for	 fiscal	 policy,	 this	 is	 an	 overly	 timid	 step	
forward.	We	really	need	much	more.	
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